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Abstract 
The main focus of this study is an analysis of the impact on civil and political rights of 
democracy promotion strategies applied by the three European organizations in 
Moldova in the 1990s-early 2000s. Nowadays democracy promotion is at the top of the 
agenda of policy-makers around the globe. The results of these democracy promotion 
activities are quite mixed: some of them seem to work in certain cases, others to have 
no effect whatsoever. There is also a lack of consensus regarding the effectiveness of 
various democracy promotion strategies in the scholarly literature. This study aims to 
contribute to the existing literature by expanding the analysis to a new case (Moldova), 
focusing on one sector (civil and political rights) and comparing the effects of the two 
types of democracy promotion strategies (incentive-based and socialization-based). The 
study argues that domestic actors in Moldova tended to respond more to incentive-
based democracy promotion strategies than to socialization-based ones, and it also 
shows through qualitative analysis and process-tracing of the data that the absence of 
membership conditionality does not necessarily presuppose the failure of incentive-
based methods.  
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Introduction  
The transformational changes that swept across the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s pushed democracy promotion to the top 
of the agenda of policy-makers around the globe. As a result, the literature on 
democracy promotion, which has also grown considerably in recent years, increasingly 
recognises the importance of the changed international environment in the 1990s for 
providing new opportunities for democracy promotion.1 Studies on the international 
dimension of democratization often come to similar conclusions: that any rigorous 
analysis of the democratization process should not overlook its international dimension, 
and that outside actors (and other factors) can influence domestic politics. However, 
often the research on the role of one set of such actors, international organizations 
(IOs), tends to focus on a single institution and the particular strategy it applied.2 For 
instance, a considerable body of literature analysed the effects of EU conditionality on 
the domestic politics of the East European candidate states.3 These studies seem to 
disregard the vast diplomatic efforts of the Council of Europe (COE) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or they tend to focus on 
broad democratic trends rather than particular policies.4 Cases regarded as democratic 
“laggards” or “hybrids”, which fall beyond the sphere of interest of the EU and other 
regional organizations and which, as a consequence, do not show clear signs of 
interaction between international democracy promotion and domestic factors, also tend 
to be underrepresented in these researchers’ agendas.  
This study aims to address these gaps in the scholarly literature by analysing 
how the OSCE, the COE and the EU influenced the government of Moldova to promote 
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civil and political rights during the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s.5 Why, despite 
the rhetorical commitment to democratic norms, were Moldovan authorities so slow in 
adopting and implementing human right legislation? Does the blame for Moldova's 
"sinking into a grey zone" and lack of democratic progress lie exclusively with 
domestic factors and political elites? Or did the democracy promotion strategies of 
European organizations involved in Moldova have any effect on this? In 2001, when the 
Communists6 came to power, the cases of violation of civil and political freedoms by 
the authorities became more frequent. At that time it seemed that the return of the 
communists did not particularly favour the protection of civil and political rights in 
Moldova. Why, then, did the communist government adopt most of the required human 
rights legislation within the first two years of its rule? What can explain the degree of 
governmental response and timing of their policy decisions? These are some of the 
empirical puzzles which this article tries to answer.  
The article starts with setting out conceptual and theoretical framework of 
analysis and discussing some insights from the existing literature. It then proceeds with 
setting the domestic context: it discusses peculiarities of transition in Moldova and also 
summarises the activities and strategies of the three European organizations involved in 
Moldova. Then the empirical analysis of the cases based on qualitative data follows. 
Finally, the article draws a number of conclusions and discusses some policy 
implications. 
 
Democracy promotion by IOs: views from the literature and conceptual 
framework 
External actors can promote, protect and enforce democracy around the world in a 
number of ways. Diane Ethier defines various methods of promoting democracy as 
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democracy promotion strategies (DPS) – strategies which have been used in recent 
years by western governments and international organizations to induce states to 
achieve democratic transition or consolidation. 7  Given the growing importance of 
democracy promotion especially since the early 1990s various theory- and policy-
related questions arise. When are DPS more likely to be effective? Which methods of 
democracy promotion can be expected to succeed in influencing domestic actors’ 
behaviour and what mechanisms govern the interaction between external democracy 
promotion and domestic factors? The recent trend in the scholarly literature is an 
increasing number of studies that attempt to address these questions and fill the gap in 
democratization and international relations literatures.8 As Burnell and Calvert recently 
pointed out, ‘contemporary scholarship is now well past the point where it was valid to 
say the international dimensions of Democratization had been neglected’. 9  The 
conclusions of one such study are particularly relevant to this analysis, namely, that not 
all IOs are equally effective in democracy promotion; that some DPS seem to be more 
effective than others; that incentive-based methods such as membership conditionality 
are more effective in changing domestic actors’ policies than socialization-based 
methods.10 
A number of criteria can be used to classify DPS.11 Various external actors use 
different DPS depending on their resources, democracy aid objectives, and 
organizational structure. This article follows Kelley’s approach and focuses on two 
specific DPS or, as Kelley defines them, “specific mechanisms through which 
international institutions may influence state behaviour”12: conditionality and normative 
pressure. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, this article views political 
conditionality as an incentive-based DPS, and normative pressure as a socialization-
based DPS. The reason for such categorization rests on distinction between two 
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different logics of action they follow: a ’logic of consequentiality’ and a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, respectively.13  In brief, according to the logic of consequentiality, 
domestic actors follow norms because they want to maximize their individual utility 
and decrease the costs of non-compliance. According to the logic of appropriateness, 
actors follow norms for intrinsic reasons: ‘based on personal dispositions informed by 
social beliefs, they do what is deemed appropriate in a given situation and given their 
social role’.14 Therefore, IOs choose their democracy promotion activities according to 
their preferred logic of action in relation to a particular democratising state: for 
instance, teaching, convincing and arguing within the logic of appropriateness and 
social influence, material threats and promises within the logic of consequentiality.15 
Conditionality implies provision of particular benefits by an IO to a 
democratising state under certain conditions. An IO can use negative and positive 
incentives in order to make a democratising state to comply with conditionality. 
Negative incentives comprise sanctions and the threat of sanctions in respect of 
international financial support to governments and economic development aid. Positive 
incentives offered by an IO to a democratising state can include institutional 
membership, association status, trade benefits, technical assistance and other types of 
democracy aid, as well as an increase of aid as an additional reward in case of 
satisfactory performance of the recipient. Overall, the effects of political conditionality 
on behaviour of domestic actors ‘correspond with a rationalist set of assumptions that 
define domestic actors as cost-benefit-calculating, utility-maximising actors’. 16 
Democratising states comply with political conditionality because either positive 
incentives (‘carrots’) on offer are crucial for them, or the costs of negative incentives 
(‘sticks’) exceed the costs of compliance with conditions posed by democracy 
promoters.  
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The defining feature of the second mechanism of influence, normative pressure, 
is that IOs do not link any concrete incentives to behaviour but rely solely on the use of 
norms to either persuade, shame, or praise domestic actors into changing their 
policies.17 For instance, normative pressure occurs when an IO suggests a recipient 
government certain policy changes without offering any reward other than approval by 
an IO. By using normative pressure to promote democracy IOs rely on a set of 
socialisation processes such as social influence or persuasion. Various causal 
mechanisms operate here. The persuasion mechanisms cause policy change due to 
changing minds, opinions and attitudes and affecting identity18 of domestic actors. The 
social influence mechanisms are rationally based: actors will conform to policy change 
requests from the outside because they value certain social rewards (such as status, 
legitimacy, a sense of belonging) 19  or want to avoid social punishments (such as 
shaming, shunning, exclusion).20 Thus, IOs can ‘socialize’ democratising states into 
democratic practices via either persuasion or social influence, or both: they can teach 
and persuade as well as shame and pressurize domestic actors into democratic policies.  
Table 1.1 summarises the theoretical concepts discussed above and outlines 
instrumental tools used by IOs when applying incentive-based or socialization-based 
DPS.  
Table 1 about here (see next page) 
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Table 1. International organizations’ strategies to promote democracy: definitions, causal mechanisms and institutional tools 
 Conditionality Normative pressure 
Definition Provision of particular benefits by an IO to a democratising 
state under certain conditions such as democratic advance 
and respect for civil and political rights 
 Reliance by an IO on norms to persuade, shame or praise a 
democratising state into democratic policies including respect for civil 
and political rights 
Causal 
mechanisms of 
domestic impact 
Positive incentives 
(rewards) 
Negative incentives 
(sanctions) 
Persuasion 
(teaching, convincing, arguing) 
Social influence 
(social rewards and 
punishments) 
Institutional 
tools 
1. Gate-keeping: accessing to negotiations and further stages 
in the accession and/or association process 
 Privileged trade / Trade barriers and embargos  
 Additional aid and technical assistance / suspension and 
withdrawal of aid 
Signing an enhanced form of association agreement / No 
association agreement or significant delays in signing it 
2. Benchmarking and monitoring:  
Evaluation of overall progress/regress in regular 
reports         
Decisions at important meetings/official requests for 
policy change that provide deadlines for action / for 
introducing sanctions  
Partnership agreements and other official documents 
identify gaps in legislation 
More intensive dialogue and interaction / Weaker 
dialogue and interaction 
 
3. Opening of accession / association negotiations 
4. Accession / New association status in an IO 
 
1. Direct official statements and declarations expressing opinion 
about current state and desired direction of policy 
2. Guidance and argumentation in written follow up reports from 
fact-finding visits 
3. Missions in the field / ad hoc visits 
                  Numerous personal interaction opportunities 
  in       Observation in policy process on political committees and 
parliament 
                   Monitoring and production of reports 
            Project-based aid and technical assistance 
4. Legal expert teams to guide and advise the policy as it is forming 
5. Providing recommendations that outline the general standards for 
laws 
6. Participation by national officials in institutional meetings / short-
term national chairmanship of the main institutional bodies 
of an IO 
7. Twinning and training  
Secondment of officials from established democracies to 
work in national ministries and other parts of public 
administration 
Training courses aimed at main national stakeholders 
involved in the democracy promotion process 
Adapted partly from Kelley 2004b21 and Grabbe22.
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It is noteworthy that some of the institutional tools can be used within both types of 
DPS and there is a certain degree of overlap between them: for instance, aid and technical 
assistance, production of reports, provision of legal expertise, dialogue and interaction. So, 
the main difference here lies not only in what an IO can offer to a democratising state but 
in how it can offer. For instance, when IOs allocate aid and technical assistance under 
incentive-based DPS, they are more explicit in outlining conditions of this offer: what a 
recipient state should do, by when and how the actions of the latter will be rewarded or 
punished in case of compliance/non-compliance, respectively. Assistance, allocated under 
socialization-based DPS, is accompanied by more vague expectations on the part of an IO 
and it usually estimates fixed annual financial funds regardless of a recipient’s 
performance. Also, reports produced by IOs that use incentive-based DPS are, in general, 
more frequent and explicit in their evaluation and assessment in comparison to reports 
following socialization-based DPS which tend to have a softer, recommendatory tone. 
Dialogue and interaction facilitated via both types of DPS differ along similar lines.  
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the case under investigation, an 
important caveat is necessary. The division between incentive-based DPS and 
socialization-based DPS is not always clear. The main difficulty lies in the fact that very 
rarely IOs use incentives towards a democratising state without trying to achieve certain 
level of normative convergence, or socialization, with the latter. Usually, IOs start with 
socialization-based DPS and only in case of non-compliance and/or lack of democratic 
progress they proceed to using more material incentives. In this regard, it becomes 
challenging to separate effects of the two types of DPS and link them with policy results. 
As Kelley similarly notes: ‘since conditionality is always used as an extension of normative 
pressure, however, evaluating the effectiveness of conditionality alone is more difficult’.23 
One of the methodological possibilities to tackle this challenge is via detailed case study 
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with process tracing that provides information on the timing of events and action, as well as 
motivation, attitudes and rhetoric of actors on both sides of the democracy promotion 
relationship. Also, analysing instances of normative persuasion applied in the absence of 
incentive-based methods can strengthen the power of inferences on effectiveness of the two 
types of DPS. Counterfactual analysis might also prove to be beneficial in disentangling the 
effects. This article makes use of all three methods.  
 
Setting the domestic context: transition to democracy in Moldova 
 
Moldovan politics after independence can be characterized as a period of high political 
instability and economic stagnation. Like other post-Soviet republics Moldova suffered 
from unstable government coalitions and subsequent frequent changes in government, even 
between elections. Moldova has had 6 prime ministers in the period from 1990 till now. 
The current prime-minister, Vasile Tarlev, has the longest ‘political life-span’ – 5 years in 
power so far. Both parliamentary and presidential elections have been bitterly contested, 
bringing to the political scene new presidents and causing considerable changes in the party 
and ideological composition of the parliament.24 As a consequence, the Moldovan party 
system is usually characterised as extremely pluralist and fragmented especially in the 
1990s. 25  Overall, elections are considered free and fair, however some international 
observers report irregularities prior to the elections such as unequal campaigning 
opportunities and bias of the electoral code rules in favour of the governmental party.26 The 
Moldovan constitution underwent a significant change in 2001: a semi-presidential system 
of government was changed to a parliamentary system vesting more powers in the national 
legislature including election of the president and approval of the cabinet. Thus, Moldova 
became one of the few parliamentary regimes in the former Soviet Union, which acquired 
all necessary attributes in order to meet the standard minimum definitions of democracy.27  
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In light of such positive developments, which one might regard as a good start in 
any Democratization process, a fair question arises: did democracy follow in Moldova? 
Unfortunately, it did not. Moldova can be regarded as one of the hybrid regimes which 
despite the establishment of some democratic procedures remains largely authoritarian and 
weak in democratic terms. A high level of political pluralism in this case is not due to an 
inherent difficulty to establish and implement democratic institutions but rather due to 
fragmentation of the Moldovan government and weakness of its leaders to impose a truly 
authoritarian rule.28 The 2006 Freedom House’s Democracy Score (FH DS) for Moldova is 
4.96, which places it on the borderline between such regime type categories as ‘transitional 
government or hybrid regime’ (FH DS=4) and ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regime’ 
(FH DS=5).29 The Polity IV Scores for Moldova are on a more positive side: in the period 
from 2001 to 2004 Moldova’s Democracy Score was equal to 8, which represents the 
lowest threshold for a country to be considered democratic.30 The discrepancy between the 
two scores does not seem to be very high if placing Moldova among hybrid or transitional 
regimes that have certain democratic minimums in terms of procedures but lack democratic 
substance.  
Two major structural factors influenced Moldova’s prospects for democratization. 
One of them is the slow and contradictory pace of the economic transition. In the first half 
of the 1990s Moldova managed to conduct a number of market-oriented reforms earning ‘a 
reputation as one of the leading reformers in the region’.31 As a result of these reforms, 
Moldova’s private sector is estimated at around 80 per cent of the official GDP dominating 
in the services sector and agriculture.32 Despite these achievements in moving towards 
market, the Moldovan economy fell into deep and long recession in the second half of the 
1990s, resuming economic growth only in 2000 and onwards. The economy remains 
extremely dependent on external factors such as trade with Russia and Ukraine, and inflow 
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of migrant workers’ remittances which accounted for more than 30 % of GDP in 2005.33 
The second factor, is the on-going political conflict in the eastern part of the country, 
Transnistria. The authorities of the self-proclaimed ‘Dniester Moldovan Republic’ refuse to 
recognize the authority and jurisdiction of the Moldovan state claiming its special status 
and striving for closer links with Russia and Ukraine. The un-settled conflict undermines 
Moldova’s capacity to emerge as a viable and stable democratic state as well as to sustain 
economic growth by broadening the country’s economic base.  
What is the situation with civil and political rights in Moldova? Radical reforms in 
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s caused a boom in political activity in all former Soviet 
republics, including Moldova. Among the main demands of the newly emerged political 
movements in Moldova was to put an end to the dominance of the Russian language over 
the Moldovan language and to give the latter the status of the state language. In the first 
half of the 1990s various reforms were pursued by the ruling elites in order to support and 
promote the use of the Moldovan language and, overall, these reforms can be regarded as 
positive developments in ensuring respect for the civil and political rights of ethnic 
Moldovans in Moldova.  
The development of free media in Moldova since independence has followed a 
somewhat similar path. Compared to the Soviet period, there have been definite positive 
changes in the Moldovan media: with the advent of glasnost and perestroika, pluralism of 
opinions as well as freedom of expression were encouraged. The number of print and 
electronic media including the ones in the Moldovan language has considerably increased. 
Thus, the demands of the population for more sources of alternative information were met 
to a certain extent. However, Moldovan governments seems to be very slow in adopting 
and implementing legislation in order to ensure the freedom of media in Moldova. 
Moreover, there was some backsliding away from democratization and respect for civil and 
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political rights after 2001, when the Communists came to power in Moldova. They 
managed to adopt a number of controversial legislative acts which created new challenges 
for further reforms in the field of civil and political rights in Moldova.  
Overall, Moldova has made some progress in reforming legislation on civil and 
political freedoms in comparison to the Soviet era. But its human rights record is still far 
from perfect. The most frequently infringed political rights are those which interfere with 
attempts on the part of the leadership and government to consolidate more power. Among 
them are: freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, the right to non-
discrimination, the right to a free press, etc. Annual reports by the Amnesty International 
(AI) for the 2001-2003 period registered serious restrictions imposed by the Moldovan 
government on freedom of expression as well as attempts to silence opposition 
politicians.34 For the period from 1997 to 2006 the Freedom House’s (FH) average score 
for press freedom in Moldova is 4.5, which puts it into a ‘partly free’ category.35 There are 
also significant implementation problems. Moldovan authorities were always quite positive 
in their pro-democratic rhetoric and recognise the respect for civil and political rights as a 
necessary attribute of any viable democracy, but they were quite slow and at times even 
reluctant to transform their words into actions. The question is: did international 
organizations (IOs) have any influence on the government’s determination to pursue 
reforms in the civil and political rights sector in Moldova?  
 
European organizations and promotion of civil and political rights in Moldova 
Most of the European organizations involved in democracy promotion in Moldova 
recognise the importance of the rule of law and respect for civil and political rights for 
achieving meaningful democratic consolidation. However, there is a certain variation in 
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IOs’ efforts to influence human rights policy in Moldova: they seem to approach this issue 
with different strategies, resources and levels of involvement.  
The COE’s initial DPS in Moldova were mainly socialization-based: membership 
conditionality prior to accession was never applied towards Moldova, and the main focus 
was on teaching and persuading domestic elites to accept democratic norms via various 
legal assistance programmes. However, as the empirical analysis below will show, on 
several occasions the COE did apply incentive-based DPS to Moldova. Among them were 
allocation of additional aid, evaluation of overall progress in regular reports, provision of 
deadlines for action and a more intensive dialogue and interaction. Via numerous visits, 
reports and communiqué the COE officials made sure that the conditional nature of the 
COE assistance was fully understood by the Moldovan authorities. As a COE official 
pointed out: ‘The COE uses a soft pressure towards Moldova: we don’t normally use sticks, 
but we use lots of carrots. But carrots depend on Moldova’s commitment to 
democratise…’.36 
 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established its 
mission in Moldova in 1993. The OSCE’s activities cover a broad spectrum of issues such 
as democratic transformation, human rights, combating trafficking in human beings, 
military security. The cooperation between OSCE and Moldova was not conditional on 
either fulfilment of minimal democratic criteria or adoption of legalised standards in the 
field of democracy and human rights. The Moldovan case is not unique in this sense: the 
OSCE used normative pressure towards most of the post-communist states in the region 
that embarked on the ‘journey’ of democratic transition and consolidation in the early 
1990s. The main OSCE mechanisms for addressing human rights issues in Moldova are 
monitoring of the major developments, issuing of recommendations to the authorities, 
sending of fact-finding and rapporteur missions, establishing a permanent field office 
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which is primarily responsible for conflict resolution and facilitation of closer contacts with 
the OSCE.  In general, the OSCE’s principal democracy promotion strategies can be 
characterized as mostly socialization-based methods focused on persuasion and norm 
promotion rather than on offering various incentives in exchange for compliance with 
conditions on democratic progress and respect for human rights.  
Formally, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Moldova started 
in 1994 when Moldova signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the 
EU. It should be noted that the emphasis was initially put on economic cooperation in order 
to support the efforts of Moldovan authorities to develop economy and to complete the 
transition into a market economy. No special programmes were initially set up for 
promoting respect for civil and political rights in Moldova. However, despite this, it would 
be too simplistic to rule out the EU as a potential promoter of further democratization. By 
having a closer look at the main provisions and conditions of assistance to Moldova as set 
out in a number of the EU’s Council of Ministers’ and European Commission’s regulations 
throughout the 1990s, including the PCA itself, one can note that a ‘democratic progress 
and respect for human rights’ clause as a condition of further assistance and, more 
significantly, future EU-Moldova cooperation, is present in almost all of them.37  And 
although complete termination of PCA and consequent withdrawal of assistance was never 
applied by the EU in relation to Moldova, it did gradually offer a number of positive 
incentives such as gate-keeping, signing of privileged trade agreements and an enhanced 
form of association agreement, additional aid and technical assistance.  
The EU’s and other donors’ financial assistance is important to Moldova in a 
number of aspects. First of all, the EU is among the top three donors which provide 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Moldova. Also, the EU is the second largest 
technical assistance donor after the USA. According to the World Bank (WB) and OECD 
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data in 2003-04 the EU’s share of gross ODA equalled to $ 9 million.38 Secondly, foreign 
financial aid constitutes an important part of government’s revenue. In the period from 
1999 to 2003 the average net receipts from all donors constituted about a third of 
government expenditure.39 Over the same period the EU’s share was about a quarter of 
total external aid received by Moldova. Thirdly, the Moldovan economy is desperate for 
external help. Moldova has been labelled as ‘the poorest country in Europe’ and is 
classified by the WB as a low-income economy. The country’s GDP per capita is the 
lowest in Europe: real GDP in 2004 was still less than half of the 1989 level. Also, 
Moldova’s external debt is extremely high: in 2003 it exceeded $ 1.5 billion. The external 
debt/GDP ratio in 2003 was about 76 per cent.  Thus, these figures show that the Moldovan 
government simply cannot afford to not receive financial assistance from external actors.  
Overall, the IOs’ activities in Moldova conform well to the definitions and 
conceptualisations of the two DPS. Out of all three the OSCE was the only IO to rely solely 
on socialization-based methods in order to change governmental policies in civil and 
political rights. Two of the IOs, the EU and COE, have used incentive-based and 
socialization-based methods interchangeably at various times. How effective were these 
methods? 
 
 Freedoms of media, expression and information in Moldova: the role of European 
organizations   
 
Out of the three organizations under consideration, the COE and, later on, the EU clearly 
stand out in terms of the frequency, content and character of their involvement. Moldova 
was the first post-Soviet republic to be granted membership in the COE on the 13th of July 
1995. The Parliamentary Assembly’s opinion on Moldova’s preparedness for the COE 
membership optimistically stated in June 1995:  
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‘Membership of the Council of Europe at this juncture should strengthen the cause 
of democracy and the rule of law, improve the protection of human rights and 
freedoms and enhance political and economic stability in [Moldova]’.40  
As part of the admission commitments concerning freedoms of expression and information 
taken by Moldova were: adoption of the new Criminal Code and Code of Criminal 
Procedure in conformity with the COE standards within a year of accession; ratification 
and application of the major COE conventions; confirmation of complete freedom of 
religion and the peaceful solution to the dispute between the Moldovan Orthodox Church 
and the Bessarabian Orthodox Church41; non-application of the articles 54 and 55 of the 
Moldovan Constitution in a manner restricting fundamental human rights and contrary to 
international standards42. Out of all commitments mentioned above only those regarding 
signing and ratification of the major COE conventions have been more or less fulfilled by 
Moldova within the time-frame set out by the COE: most of the conventions have been 
ratified by Moldova by the late 1990s. As regards to more substantive policy issues there 
were major delays with the adoption of the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, 
Moldova failed to solve the dispute between the two orthodox churches independently, and 
the European Court of Human Rights had to intervene in 2004; and during 2001 and 2002 
the Moldovan authorities continued to interpret provisions of articles 54 and 55 contrary to 
the European Convention of Human Rights43.  
As the COE had granted its membership to Moldova ex-post, it was left with only 
one option in following up how the authorities were fulfilling COE membership 
commitments: normative pressure via persuasion. In this regard, the COE’s and other 
European organizations’ strategies to solicit changes in Moldova’s human rights policy in 
the 1990s are interesting to analyse because they provide a good test of the independent 
effect of normative pressure as one of the DPS highlighted by this article. The OSCE’s 
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major methods of involvement in Moldova during the same period were also socialization-
based and the EU did not set up any special cooperation programme devoted to promotion 
of freedom of expression and information in Moldova. This crucially simplifies the case of 
determining effects of the socialization-based DPS because any findings of interactions 
between the organizations that apply them and Moldova as well as findings of policy 
changes after such interactions would strengthen the argument of the effectiveness of 
socialization-based DPS.  
Throughout the 1990s the COE’s main focus was mainly on promoting democratic 
norms in Moldova via teaching and persuading domestic political elites. Two co-operation 
programmes were initiated in Moldova: on legal assistance and freedom of expression and 
media. The main working methods of these programmes were organising training courses, 
workshops, seminars and conferences with the participation of Moldovan journalists and 
lawmakers, and the COE experts; and providing written legal expertise on proposed 
legislative acts and drafts. Similarly, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) also undertook ‘democratic persuasion’ and ‘teaching’ activities 
in Moldova: throughout the second half of the 1990s ODIHR has organised a number of 
seminars for Moldovan journalists and representatives of NGOs, dispatched legal expert 
assessment and review missions including assistance in the drafting of laws and practical 
management training for the constitutional court44.  
As part of its election monitoring activities in the Moldovan parliamentary elections 
of 1994, 1998 and in the 1996 presidential elections, the OSCE expressed a number of 
concerns regarding the use of broadcast media during electoral campaigns and pointed out 
that the government should secure a more equal access to the media for all contestants 
participating in the elections.45  However, the OSCE’s concerns did not gain much attention 
on the domestic scene. 46  The 2001 parliamentary elections have received the same 
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criticisms from the OSCE and other independent observers.47  In July 1999 two advisers of 
the OSCE Representative on freedom of media (RFM) conducted for the first time an 
assessment visit to Moldova. Among the major problems identified in the report to the 
OSCE Permanent Council were: ‘…lack of funding, lack of serious independent 
journalism, extensive domination of the media by political parties…’ 48  It was also 
recommended to the Moldovan authorities that ‘[they] should avoid for the time being any 
strict regulation of the Moldovan and Russian [language] percentage of broadcast 
programming’.49 However, the authorities ignored the OSCE’s recommendations regarding 
this and in September 1999 adopted quite a restrictive legal provision on language quota in 
broadcasting.50 
In sum, despite rhetoric that the government was working on these issues, no real 
progress was made. By 2000 Moldova still lacked legislation that would guarantee and 
protect freedoms of expression and information including new Criminal and Criminal 
Procedure Codes, Civil Code, Law on Press, Law on National Broadcasting Company. 
Moreover, the draft Penal and Civil codes, which the national legislature approved on 
several occasions during 1997-2001, contained provisions that negatively affected freedom 
of expression in Moldova. Among such provisions were excessive penalties for the 
expression of the state secret, for defamation, for insult of a judge, Prosecutor, member of 
police forces, for civil disobedience and profanation of state symbols.51 As a representative 
of the Moldova’s Helsinki Committee for Human Rights pointed out: ‘These provisions 
clearly represented a step towards establishing a criminal sanctioning machine against 
freedom of expression in Moldova’.52 These cases show that the socialization-based DPS 
used by the COE and the OSCE in the 1990s were insufficient and didn’t bring necessary 
policy changes. In 2002 both FH and AI reported deterioration in freedom of the press in 
Moldova and identified domination of the ruling party as the main cause for it.53 The 
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number of applications from Moldovan citizens to the European Court for Human Rights 
(ECHR) has almost doubled in 2000 and 2001 in comparison to previous years.54 
The cases of institutional non-engagement are also interesting to explore because 
they are useful control cases for illustrating domestic policy reforms in the absence of the 
IOs’ DPS. As Kelley points out: ‘To demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship, one must 
also show that outcomes in the absence of institutional engagement were not equally 
compatible with international standards’.55 And, indeed, some laws adopted in the absence 
of any institutional engagement (or in the context of weak institutional engagement) were 
not compatible with the international standards: they contained somewhat vague 
definitions, which allowed the authorities to use them for consolidating their dominant 
position in domestic politics. For instance, in 1995 the parliament passed the Law on 
Audiovisual Broadcasting. No international institution was involved in drafting the law. 
The law was so vague that since 1995 it went through a number of misinterpretations and 
misapplications as well as inadmissible interference by the legislative and executive 
branches.56 The most questionable were the law’s limitations with regards to independence 
of the Coordinating Audiovisual Council (CAC):  
‘that the leaders of national public radio and television institutions are appointed by 
the Parliament upon the proposal of the CAC’ and ‘that the number of licenses to 
emission issued by the CAC requires acknowledgement and approval by the 
Ministry of Communication and Information’57.  
However, despite such obvious limitations, the IOs did not react. Representatives of several 
Moldovan NGOs on human rights acknowledged the link between institutional non-
engagement and the low democratic quality of the law: ‘Without support from international 
institutions, we were on our own in protesting the law. The law would have been more 
meaningful if international institutions would have been involved’. 58  Similarly, an 
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independent analyst of Moldovan politics commented: ‘One of the reasons to such 
underperformance on this law was a lack of effective constraints and checks on elites in 
power exercised from both the inside and the outside of Moldova’.59 The government’s 
position on the law changed, however, in 2002 when the COE became directly involved 
with the issue. 
Overall, the IOs’ DPS towards Moldova began to change, in 2001 after the 
‘spectacular comeback’ of the communists to power. 60  Despite the fact that the 
communists’ leader Vladimir Voronin publicly expressed his commitment to adjust 
Moldovan legislation and governmental policies to European policies61, there was a general 
deterioration in the human rights situation and especially in relation to freedoms of 
expression and media in Moldova in 2001-2002. The drafts for the Criminal Code, 
Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Code discussed by the Moldovan Parliament in 2001-
2002 contained a number of provisions, especially the ones related to defamation and libel 
to protect the state, its authorities and symbols from criticism, which could have affected 
freedom of expression. In April 2001 the permanent bureau of the Moldovan Parliament 
adopted a new regulation, which considerably limited public access to parliamentary 
hearings and discussion records. The delay in modifying the law on audiovisual 
broadcasting has led to the state’s domination of the press and uneven distribution of the 
press between public (state-controlled) and private owners. There were wide spread 
allegations by journalists from the state and private television companies of open 
censorship by state institutions.62  
This regress in respect of civil liberties in Moldova could not remain unnoticed by 
the democracy promoters involved in Moldova. They gradually changed their DPS from 
normative persuasion to social influence methods and, later on, more incentive-based DPS 
in order to influence the government’s human rights policy. The main ‘triggers’ for such 
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shift in DPS were political instability and the standoff between the ruling communist party 
and the main opposition party (the Christian-Democratic Party of Moldova) in February 
and March of 2002. Again, international institutions started with normative pressure in 
order to influence government’s behaviour in relation to the opposition. At first, the COE 
was reluctant to interfere at all. On January 17, 2002 the PACE (The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the COE) Chairman Lord Russell-Johnston met with President Vladimir 
Voronin and emphasized that the tackling of ongoing protest demonstrations in Chisinau is 
‘strictly the competence of Moldovan government’. 63  However, the political crisis 
intensified after 22 January, when the government suspended the activities of the 
opposition Popular Christian Democratic Party (PPCD) for one month. The EU also 
decided to start with normative pressure via ‘shaming’: in the letter sent to the Moldovan 
government on 30 January the European Commission urged it to annul the suspension of 
PPCD and expressed concerns that ‘suspending a political party represented in the 
parliament is incompatible with Moldova’s democratic character and contravenes the 
values to which Moldova subscribed when it joined the COE’.64 On the same day the 
suspended PPCD petitioned the government demanding consideration of the European 
Commission’s letter, but no reaction from the government followed on this.  
However, only after the COE demanded from the Moldovan government to provide 
explanations on ‘how the restrictions on the PPCD comply with articles in the European 
Convention on Human Rights covering elections, freedom of thought, expression and 
organization’ by 22 February65, the response from the authorities was quick to follow. 
Already on 8 February the one-month suspension of the PPCD was lifted and this allowed 
the PPCD to participate in electoral campaigning for the April 2002 local elections. The 
Justice Minister Ion Morei confirmed that this decision ‘reflected a response to the 
concerns expressed by the COE over the suspension’.66 In terms of the COE’s strategy on 
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this matter we can classify it as conditionality because firstly, clear deadlines were 
indicated for change of the government’s position, and secondly, implicit threats 
concerning Moldova’s membership in the COE and its compliance with the COE’s human 
rights acquis were voiced. 67  There was also another important factor which changed 
government’s position on this issue – promise of a positive incentive. As the then head of 
the EU’s TACIS Office in Chisinau revealed, in early February the government was 
notified that the European Commission’s delegation was going to visit Moldova at the end 
of February in order to discuss possibilities to disburse the €15 million credit and the 
results of negotiations would also depend on the political situation in the country.68  
In March 2002 there was a new wave of protests on the streets on Chisinau. This 
time the main demands of the anti-communist demonstrators in the streets of Chisinau in 
2002 were the end of country’s ‘information blockade’ and, specifically, the transformation 
of Teleradio Moldova, the state-owned television and radio company into a national public 
service modelled on Western public broadcasters like the BBC. The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the COE (PACE), acting as mediator between the Communist government 
and the opposition, demanded in its Resolution 1280 of 24 April 2002, 
 
the revision of…legislation and amendment of the status of Teleradio Moldova to 
make it an independent public corporation; an immediate start of work by the 
relevant parliamentary committee; use of the COE experts’ assistance in defining 
the public service status of the Moldovan radio and television corporation. This 
work should be completed by the end of the current parliamentary session, on 31 
July 2002….69  
 
Other demands were related to the situation of freedom of expression in Moldova,  
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The Assembly invites the authorities to revise the 1994 Act on the Status of 
Members of Parliament, regarding the provisions governing the lifting of 
immunity and removal from office; and to revise parliament’s rules of procedure 
in order to widen the opposition’s rights…70 
 
Additionally, the PACE recommended to the Council of Ministers and the COE member 
states to afford Moldova increased assistance including legal expertise and initiation of new 
co-operation programmes.71 Thus, not only have explicit policy changes been requested 
with clearly set out deadlines for compliance but also new incentives of increased 
assistance have been offered. It is also noteworthy that the COE’s demands were fully 
backed by the USAID, the largest bilateral donor in Moldova: on 20 March 2002 the U.S. 
Foreign Minister Colin Powell also threatened to stop all U.S. programmes of technical 
assistance to Moldova, as well as those assisting Moldova in its relations with international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and for achieving European integration.72 
What was the reaction of the OSCE to the deterioration of political and civil 
freedoms in Moldova in 2001 and 2002? The OSCE again relied only on socialization-
based methods such as persuasion and social influence in order to change governmental 
human rights policies. No additional incentives were offered and no credible punishments 
for violation by the government of civil freedoms have been identified. In September 2002, 
the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media undertook a second 
assessment visit to Moldova during which the main concerns with the newly adopted law 
on transforming the state company Teleradio-Moldova into a public broadcaster were 
identified. In March and April 2002 the OSCE Chairman in Office Jaime Gama expressed 
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on several occasions concerns about confrontation between the government and protesters 
and ‘called on both sides to show restraint and engage in dialogue’.73  
As regards to the EU’s involvement the situation has also radically changed in 2002 
as in the COE’s case: in the 2002 alone, the PCA Coordination Committee met twice (in 
March and April). Partly, this had to do with the political instability and the government-
opposition standoff that emerged in February and March 2002. European officials wanted 
to find out what was happening in Chisinau at that time directly from the representatives of 
the government and opposition.74  In its April meeting a new area of cooperation was added 
to the existing ones: assistance in the reform of the judicial system and harmonisation of 
Moldovan legislation with European standards. Also in April 2002 the EU decided to grant 
Moldova (together with Ukraine and Belarus) a special status of ‘EU neighbour’ and 
include it in the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Although at that time it 
wasn’t entirely clear yet what the new status would offer to Moldova, it was still regarded 
by the Moldovan authorities as ‘a clear sign of attention of the EU to Moldova’75. As 
Mariana Zolotko, the then head of the European Integration Department within the 
Ministry of Economics, put it: ‘At this moment, we can talk about a serious change of 
perception of Moldova by the EU’.76 Among the new incentives on offer were: the start of 
talks on preferential trade agreements for Moldova in the European market, assistance in 
attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) into Moldova, increase of technical assistance 
through TACIS. For comparison, in 2003 alone the European Commission allocated to 
Moldova through TACIS a total of € 50 million euro, whereas for the whole period of 
1991-1999 the total from the TACIS assistance to Moldova is estimated at only € 61.8 
million euro.77 Since 2001 the EU also became more actively involved in promoting further 
democratization in Moldova: it established a joint programme of cooperation between the 
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European Commission and the COE in order to strengthen democratic stability in Moldova, 
one of the priority themes of which is to support independent media. 
 Did the government make any attempts to change the policy as explicitly requested 
by the European institutions? Yes, it definitely did. On the 26 July 2002, 5 days before the 
expiration of the deadline set by the COE, a new law on the national public broadcasting 
company Teleradio-Moldova was adopted; and the 1994 Law on the Status of Members of 
Parliament was amended on the same date. Opposition was given a prime time slot on the 
national television channel for preparing its own programme ‘Opposition Hour’, as well as 
free space in the national press. President Voronin’s rhetoric confirms the link between the 
policy changes and direct involvement of the European institutions:  
‘We wish to fulfil all our commitments necessary for improving our relations with 
the EU, COE and other European organizations. And for that we should engage in a 
democratic dialogue with our political opponents and the society’.78  
An active participant at the protests in March and April 2002 and a member of the 
oppositionist PPCD party noted:  
‘In 2002 the COE and other European institutions were very important in pressuring 
the government to change its undemocratic policies. They were our important allies 
in the process’.79  
Moreover, even a member of the governmental party, PCRM, admitted that policy changes 
were instrumentally motivated:  
‘The pressure from the outside was intensifying. We could not ignore it and had to 
re-consider our position. Besides, European organizations promised us closer 
cooperation and more assistance: how could we not take this into account?’.80  
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Hence, the discussed cases show that European institutions were very much part of the 
policy change process, and their involvement became more effective when conditionality 
and new incentives were applied. 
Moreover, the COE was quite vigilant in following up the degree of implementation 
of its demands. A few months later, after monitoring the situation on the ground, PACE 
adopted another resolution stating its dissatisfaction with the quality of the new law on 
Teleradio-Moldova and demanded further changes in the drafting procedures. 81  The 
authorities complied again, and although the political opposition and NGOs were still not 
completely satisfied with the degree of independence of state television, these were clear 
signs that the authorities were willing to cooperate with both the opposition and the COE.  
 In sum, the analysis above shows that human rights policy process in Moldova has 
had a great deal of variation in the 1990s-early 2000s. At the beginning the authorities were 
extremely slow in adopting new legislation in conformance with international standards 
despite vast socialization-based efforts by the COE and the OSCE. In those cases where the 
European organizations were not engaged at all, the government did even worse: it passed 
laws that were incompatible with international standards. However, we witnessed 
considerable policy changes only when the institutions became more actively involved and 
switched to explicit incentive-based DPS. Moreover, the timing of several cases supports 
the causal connection between incentives and policy change because, as Kelley notes, ‘it is 
possible to see a pattern of issue-linkage by the institutions and response by policy makers 
within a short period of time’.82 The policymakers’ rhetoric, which accompanied policy 
changes, also confirms the influence of the European institutions and incentive-based DPS 
on government’s behaviour. 
The cases of policy deterioration in early 2000s are crucial for the article’s main 
argument in one important aspect. A contra-argument regarding the ineffectiveness of the 
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socialization-based DPS to bring about policy changes could be that of ‘duration versus 
type of involvement’.83 The fact that the government, although slowly, still adopted some 
legislation could be actually in favour of the socialization-based methods: due to the nature 
of the democratic socialization process it takes time for the domestic elites to acquiesce its 
undemocratic practices and translate democratic norms into meaningful policies. In this 
regard, one can argue that socialization-based DPS applied by the COE and the OSCE to 
Moldova in the 1990s had lagging results and could not be so easily traced as in case of the 
incentive-based DPS. Even if this is the case, why do we witness clear democratic 
‘reverses’ in Moldova’s human rights policy in 2000 and onwards? Surely, a country that is 
truly committed to democratic norms and democratization would be moving steadily, 
although at times slowly and with difficulties, along the democratic continuum. But this 
was not the case with Moldova. And why are the policy changes in 2002 temporally linked 
to the requests by the European organizations expressed via conditionality? As Kelley 
importantly notes: ‘If behavioural change occurs only when conditionality comes into 
play(…), this strengthens claims that conditionality really was the efficient cause’.84 
A counterfactual analysis can take the discussion even further. Would the case of 
the suspended oppositionist party have turned out differently without a more direct 
engagement on the part of the COE and the EU? Probably yes. At that time the 
government’s party, PCRM, still enjoyed high popular support of 73 per cent and the 
president was the country’s most popular politician with 45 per cent of support.85 So, it was 
definitely not a level of popular support that the government was most concerned with. 
Besides, the national law was on the government’s side: the protests in February and March 
2002 were never sanctioned by the Ministry of Justice and the Mayoralty of Chisinau, and, 
therefore, the government had every right to declare them illegal and prosecute the 
protesters. But it did not. Instead, it chose to change its policies in relation to freedoms of 
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expression and media in Moldova.  Case-studies and process-tracing revealed that the 
concerted efforts of the European organizations and a more explicit incentive-based 
pressure from them were the main factors that motivated change.  
Before proceeding to conclusion, one important caveat is worth mentioning. When 
analysing reforms of the human rights policy in Moldova, this article focused mostly on 
legislative changes. The main motivation behind this approach is methodological: changes 
in human rights legislation are easier to identify and trace than, say, implementation 
policies. However, the article did consider implementation issues in the case of the law on 
national broadcasting company: the government failed to fully implement the new law 
despite the COE’s conditionality and the latter had to intervene again. So, obviously, the 
results of the analysis are weakened if we take into consideration the issue of policy 
implementation. However, if we look at the human rights policy as a process, the 
legislative stage precedes the implementation stage and, in this regard, is crucial. Hence, 
positive legislative changes can be viewed as a progress in the right direction and does not 
refute the article’s argument per se.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The human rights politics of Moldova throughout its democratization process illustrates 
quite clearly how and when IOs can influence domestic policy. The European organizations 
have used both socialization-based and incentive-based methods in order to promote 
respect for civil and political rights in Moldova. The qualitative analysis and process-
tracing of the changes in democracy promotion strategies of some of the European 
organizations and of the authorities’ responses to these changes showed that the latter 
responded more to incentive-based methods than to socialization-based methods. When the 
international democracy promoters gave the authorities clear conditions and concrete 
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deadlines for compliance, they usually were quite quick in getting the message and in most 
of the cases complied with recommendations voiced from the outside. Thus, the degree of 
governmental response and timing of their policy decisions depended on the type of 
institutional involvement. In the cases analysed, incentive-based DPS were more effective 
in bringing policy change than socialization-based DPS. 
The analysis also reveals another important finding. Many students of the 
international dimension of democratization tend to find in their studies that the most 
important incentive for domestic ruling elites to democratise and comply with outside 
pressures is membership in a successful regional organization. The most illustrative 
example to this is the membership incentive offered by the EU to Central and East 
European candidate states in the 1990s and 2000s. The benefits of the eventual EU 
enlargement outweighed the domestic power costs to the ruling elites and they chose to 
comply with EU conditionality. Thus, these studies conclude, membership incentive and 
conditionality tied in with it can be seen as the most successful incentive-based methods to 
influence domestic policy. However, as the Moldovan case suggests, additional incentive-
based methods of democracy promotion can also be quite effective in bringing about 
changes in domestic policy. European institutions could change domestic policy by 
applying conditionality without clear membership incentive: they explicitly demanded 
Moldova’s compliance with international legal commitments, and also, they offered other 
incentives such as the increase of bilateral cooperation and democracy assistance. The latter 
were crucial motivational factors for the Moldovan authorities in their decision to comply, 
especially in the context of the discussed structural conditions of difficult economic and 
political transition in Moldova. 
It is important to note, however, that this study by no means questions the 
effectiveness of membership conditionality applied by IOs.  Rather, this study posits that 
 30 
the absence of membership incentive does not always precipitate the failure of democracy 
promotion strategies. IOs can still promote democracy and influence domestic policy as 
long as they choose the most appropriate methods for that. As this case shows, additional 
incentives as well as stricter monitoring of how international legal commitments are 
fulfilled might help. The important policy implication of this is that IOs need to be more 
committed to their democracy promotion endeavours and be more responsible when 
designing their methods of how to encourage domestic political elites towards further 
democratization. 
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